HANS H. HELELING
INTERNATIONAL economic relations of the United States, just as domestic ones, were heavily influenced by the recession of 1974-75 and by the resultant economic policies undertaken by most U.S. trading partners. U.S. merchandise trade responded to both the longer-term depreciation of the dollar and to differences in the severity and timing of the recessions here and abroad. Short-term fluctuations in capital movements and exchange rates were dominated hy differential growth in outpo.it, differences in monetary and fiscal policies, and differences in interest rates among trading nations.
After briefly sketching economic conditions prior to 1975, this article discusses the trade and exchange rate developments which occurred during 1975. In addition, a listing of some institutional developments which will probably have an influence on international economic activity in the future is provided.
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The recessions experienced in the major industrial countries in 1975 represented a continuation of a cyclical downswing which started in late 197~. In early to mid-1973, most countries had been concerned about high and accelerating rates of inflation and had adopted policies intended to reduce inflationary presstio'es, These policies usually took the form of reduced rates of monetary growth. This was most pronounced in Germany, Japan, the Netherlands, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom.
The recessions were aggravated in late 1973 when the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries OPEC) imposed an embargo on oil exports. Expectations were that the enobao'go would adversely alfect -cal eeoooonnc growth in the industrial countries, but that business slowdowns would oiot degenerate into severe recessions. In addition, stinoulati\-e economic policies were considered inappropriate at this time, as polievonakers were still concerned with inflation.
Toward the end of 1974 and into early 1975, however. economic conditions in most countries deteriorated more rapidly than expected, and most foreign countries responded with stinullati\-e monetary policies. In contrast, monetary growth declined in the United States from the third quai-ter of 1974 through the first quarter of 1975. 0968  0969  0970  0970  0972  0973  1974 0975 SIo, , , , , _. C, d..Th, Mi, 1.F, , , 0I, d, o, .S, , 4.., , 4 5, , d, sb, ok; 1, , , , ; 5, 11, 4 Ki, gd, , '..C, , OP 0011,,; 4,11,4 s,P,,..F,4,,,,1
In early 1975 the consensus among analysts was that ernments, including Belgium, France, Japan, the real economic growth in most industrial countries Netherlands, and the United Kingdom, also anwould resume in the second half of 1975, with recovnouneed the introduction of stimulative fiscal meascry abroad preceding that of the United States. By ures. At this time it appears that the economies of mid-year, however, the U.S. economy appeared to be Canada, Germany, and Japan, in addition to the moving out of the recession, while its major trading United States, have moved out of the recession, while partners were still searching the economic horizon for for many other countries a turnaround has not yet signs of a turnaround. 1 materialized.
As economic activity in the United States improved early in the second half of 1975, many foreign policymakers became impatient with the pace of recovery (or lack thereof) in their own countries. Suspecting that more stimulus on the part of the United States would not he forthcoming, many foreign governments adopted a ne\v series of economic policy measures, mainly in the fiscal area, For example, in August Germany announced a supplementary budget proposing an increase in expenditures of snore than 15 billion marks for new construction programs and unemployment assistance. Denmark, at that time, also announced a new program to stimulate the economy via a combination of tax reductions and expenditure increases. Beginning in September, various other gov- In summary, the economies of major industrial countries were in different stages of recovery during 1975. Adjustments to prior output shocks and restraints were nearing completion and stimulative fiscal and monetary policies were beginning to take effect. While the recovery was relatively strong in the United States, it was just beginning to manifest itself in some of time foreign trading nations in the latter half of the year. Thus, the differential rates of economic recovery were primarily responsible in shaping international transactions in 1975. dollar, some additional factors contributed to this turnaround in U.S. merchandise trade Agricultural exports remained relatively high and OPEC purchases of U5 goods increased from about $4 billion in the first three quarters of 1974 to about $7 billion in the first three quarters of 1975.
While in the first quarter of 1975 the rate of increase of U.S. merchandise exports slowed to a 9 percent annual rate (compared to a 28 percent annual rate in the fourth quarter of 1974), U.S. imports decreased absolutely at a 33 percent annual rate (compared to a 10 percent annual rate of increase in the fourth quarter)
During the second quarter of 1975, U.S. mnerchandise exports exceeded merchandise imports by an impressive $13.4 billion annual rate. In this period both exports and imports declined absolutely at annual rates of 20 percent and 40 pereent~respectively.
During the third quarter, (iS. nserchandj.se exports still exceeded imnports, hut 1w less than during the second quarter. This occurred as both mnerchandise exports and imports shifted from negative to positive rates of growth. Iii terms of product categories, U.S. agricultural exports increased somewhat coinp~n'edto last year, and manufactured goods, such as machinery and transport equipment. demand for credit resulted in a decline in U.5. shortterm interest rates relative to tImose in other countries. As illustrated in the accompanying clmart and in Table  II , during the first quarter of 1975, U.S. short-term interest rates were falling relative to those in Belgium, France, Germany, and the United Kingdom. As a resmolt, the incentive to invest in tlmese countries increased and holders of slmort-term clollar-denomnioiated assets switched to short-term assets denooninmmtcd in otlmer currencies.
Several developmnents began during the second quarter of 1975 which led to the appreciation of the dollar. Various economnic indicators in the United
States conveyed signs of imnpending economic recovery, while, as \vas mentioned earlier, recovery abroad was not yet visible. In addition, U.S. short-term interest rates began to rise relative to short-term rates in other countries. As a result, the incentives for short-term capital inflows began to shift in favor of the United States. During the second quarter, net shortterm private capital outflows decreased from the first quarter annual rate of 825.5 billion to an annual rate of $10.6 hillion.
During the third quarter a continuation of the second quarter trend led to a further appreciation of the dollar, Short-term interest rate differentials increasingly favored inflows of short-term private capital into the United States, and the United States registered a third quarter net inflow of short-term private capital of $18.5 billion. Thus, the appreciation of the U.S. dollar during the second and third quarter can he largely attributed to both the rise in U.S. short-term interest rates relative to those in other countries and the subsequent changes in short-term capital flows,
The first quarter decline of the dollar exchange rate precipitated changes in some institutional arrangements within the area of international finance. For exmtmple, in mid-March four Middle East countries severed the link betxveen timeir currencies and the U.S. dollar. Iran, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and Quatar announced the decision to tie the exchange rates of their currencies to SDRs.
In addition, the European Economic Community in late March decided to terminate time relationship between the comnmunities Unit of Account ( UA ) and the U.S. dollar.~The UA is now valued in terms of a basket of member conntrv currencies. The intent was to insulate internal EEC financial settlements from fluctuations in exchange rates of member countries vis~m vis the U.S. dollar.
In June, OPEC decided to replace time U.S. dollar with SDRs for valuation of oil as of October 1. However, on October 1 OPEC reversed its previous dccisiomm and decided to retain the U.S. dollar as the curi-ency in which oil prices are denominated. In Jmmnẽ M-tM auG at ton C y the SDR was equox ,mkmlt to about $1 25 amid the dollar agm 'ement on steps to reduce f mrtl er the role of gold had been declimung. Currenti) -time SDR is equivalent mn the internttion'ii mommetarx syst m. In essence, the to about $1.17 and tile dollar has been rising. As a 1'~en n her couo tries of the IMF agreed td) terminate result of this rise am time value of the dollar relative ti 1 t dO cept of the "official price" of gold. It was to the 5DB, it hec'imne advantageous for OPEC to <u,reed that on si th of the gold stock currently held continue the doil'a-oil price valuation, by the IMF (25.6 million ounces) would be gradually sold ow the next txvo years. Another one-sixth will Another event which was n-elated to exchange rates be rettmro ed to member countries in proportion to was the decision by France ho Jmeiy' to rejoim'm the Eurotlmeir original contribtmtions. No agreement was pean curreomcy float knowom as time "Snake." This'arreached, lmosvever regarding the nature of a future rammgement was instituted in Marclm 1973 in order to excilange rate system. Inaintaiml a maximum margin of ± 2.25 percent for -excimamlge rate fltmcttmations in transactiolms among memIn mid-November aom economic summit meeting her currencies. France had withdrawn from the of time heads of state and finance ministers of "Snake" in January 1974. Presently, tile countries parthe United States, France, Germany, Great Britain, ticipating in time "Snake' are Belgium, Deimmolark, Italy, mmmid Japail~s'asheld in Ramhouiilet, France. The Cermnanv, Lnxembomorg, the Netherlands, Norway, purpose of tile meeting was to coordinate economic Swedemm. and France.
policies of the participating countries. The cooninunique issued at the end of the meeting consisted Although the communique did not specify how erratic exchange ratc fluctuations are to he removed, outside observers generally believed that official interventmon in foreign exchange markets was the tool witlm which to achieve these goals. Moreover, time communique noted that a rapprochement of U.S. and French views regarding the international mnonetary system was achieved and that timis would facilitate agreement on outstanding issues of international monetary refonn.
Finally, in early January 1976 a meeting of the Interimn Committee of the IMF was convened in Jamaica for the purpose of discussing these outstanding issues. At this meeting an agreement was reached among the 127 member conntries of the IMF permitting individual member countries the option to choose from among three types of exchange rate systems. Individual countries will have the option of eitlmer adopting a floating exchange rate system, peggmg their currencies to other currencies, or establishing a par value for their currency in terms of SDBs. In addition, it was agreed that a general par value system could be reintroduced if 85 percent of the member countries' votes favored such a step. Presently, the votes of the United States represent about 20 percent of time total.
Of particular significance was time agreement that the floating excimange rate system would take the form of a "clean" float. That is, countries who avail themselves of floating excimange rates should "avoid mnanipulating exchange rates ... in order to prevent JANUARY 1976 effective balance-of-payments adjustment or to gain an unfair competitive advantage over other memhers.~'n To achieve a "clean" float, coumitries are required to "seek to promote stability by fostering orderly underlying economic and finarmciai conditions and a mnonetary system that does not tend to produce erratic disruptions." 0 The above requirement is consistent with the view that stable underlying economic conditions are conducive to stable exchange market comlditiomls.
During 1975 the \vorhd economy was subjected to the forces of recession. The U.S. recession was both more severe-and more short-lived than that of its trading partners. This, in turml, was conducive to first a dechimling and then to a rising U.S. dollar exchange rate, U.S. trade performance was affected by these devehopmemits, as xwtnessed by the fact that U.S. merchandise exports exceeded U.S. merchandise imports by -$10.6 billion during the first eleven months of 1975.
Although early in 1975 there were expectations that foreign economic recovery would precede that of the United States, it turned out that foreign econonlic recovery was, and in some cases still is, lagging behind that of the United States, It is expected, however, that economic growth in most industrial countries will resume in 1976. though at relatively low rates.
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